



Corporate influence on high seas fisheries management

Mapping industry interference and the risks for ocean protection

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Executive Summary

This report examines the extent and nature of fishing industry participation in Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) and in the post-2023 Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) processes established under the Global Ocean Treaty (BBNJ Agreement). Drawing exclusively on publicly available information from 2021–2025 for RFMOs and post-2023 for BBNJ processes, the research identifies measurable patterns of institutional embedding, narrative positioning and proximity between industry actors and high seas fisheries governance bodies. **Across the RFMOs analysed, fishing industry-affiliated representatives consistently account for roughly one quarter to one third of total delegates at annual meetings, participating as part of national delegations and placing commercial actors in close proximity to global fisheries decision-making.**

Key Findings

- Significant industry embedding within RFMO delegations

Up to one in three delegates at global fisheries meetings represents industry interests. Across the prioritised RFMOs, fishing industry-affiliated delegates consistently represent a substantial proportion of national delegations. In several tuna RFMOs, **industry participation regularly ranges between approximately 20–30% of total delegates per meeting**, with some bodies exceeding this range in particular years. Based on available data across the eight RFMOs examined, the indicative cross-RFMO average industry participation rate is approximately 28–29% of total delegates. Participation spans fleet operators, vessel owner associations, tuna companies, seafood processors and national fishing federations.

- Delegation-based industry access to RFMO decision-making

Across the dataset, industry representatives most commonly participate through national delegations rather than attending independently as observers, **placing private-sector actors in close proximity to negotiation processes and decision-making within RFMO governance.**

- Concentration among major fishing powers

Industry-affiliated delegates are disproportionately present within delegations of major distant-water fishing powers, particularly the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, China Mainland and Taiwan (referenced as *Chinese Taipei* in RFMOs). This indicates structured embedding within key decision-making actors.

- Limited formal industry presence in BBNJ PrepCom processes

In contrast to RFMOs, data available for post-2023 BBNJ PrepCom sessions do not show comparable direct industry embedding within state delegations. This marks **a clear difference between fisheries-sector governance bodies and the cross-sectoral biodiversity treaty framework. Fishing industry actors seem to exert influence primarily through national**

governments and through RFMO processes, with state positions reflecting prior domestic or sectoral consultations, rather than direct in-room industry advocacy.

➤ Consistent promotion of RFMO primacy

Public statements by fishing industry associations and related actors consistently emphasise that high seas fisheries are already managed through established, science-based RFMO systems, arguing that additional treaty-based spatial restrictions are redundant. **This framing reinforces the industry’s view that RFMOs are the only venue that can impose restrictions on fishing activity and that new biodiversity measures must be subrogated to pre-existing mandates.**

➤ Alignment between industry narratives and certain state positions

During BBNJ negotiations and subsequent commentary, several major fishing states advanced positions stressing non-duplication, food security, and respect for RFMO competence. These positions **closely mirror industry discourse, indicating alignment in institutional framing. This is particularly observable in the post-2023 emphasis on the BBNJ Agreement’s “non-undermining” clause, framing fishing activity as remaining firmly within RFMO competence, even in areas designated for high seas biodiversity protection.**

➤ Participation in scientific and technical processes

RFMO scientific committees rely on stock assessments, management strategy evaluation and data provision processes in which industry-affiliated experts and data sources are integrated, and have no peer-review process. **This reflects embedded participation in technical as well as political arenas , and raises a risk of 'corporate science'. By controlling the primary sources of information, the industry can steer scientific consensus toward outcomes that prioritize short-term commercial yields over the precautionary principle.**

Significance and implications

The findings highlight a clear distinction between RFMO governance and the BBNJ institutional framework. RFMOs display consistent and measurable industry embedding within national delegations and technical processes, whereas the BBNJ PrepCom structure shows limited formal industry participation. At the same time, industry narratives and certain state positions often converge around protecting RFMO mandates and avoiding regulatory duplication, reinforcing the view that imposing limits to fishing activity should remain within existing sectoral institutions.

This suggests that influence pathways related to high seas fisheries policy operate primarily through established RFMO systems rather than through the biodiversity treaty framework. The presence of industry representatives within RFMO delegations and advisory structures raises governance considerations regarding balance, transparency and accountability in

decision-making processes. For policymakers, civil society actors and researchers concerned with ambitious high seas protection, the findings indicate that focusing solely on BBNJ negotiations risks overlooking the institutional arenas where fisheries-related decisions are most directly shaped.

Overall, the analysis provides evidence of structural industry embedding within RFMO governance and highlights the importance of examining sectoral fisheries institutions when assessing influence over high seas policy and biodiversity protection.

Recommendations for first COP of the Global Ocean Treaty

If the primary mandate of RFMOs is the economic and sustainable management of fisheries resources, meaning the long-term viability of commercial exploitation, and consequently, the heavy presence of the fishing industry, the mission of the Global Ocean Treaty is fundamentally different. It is centered on holistic conservation and the protection of marine biodiversity. Therefore, while industry-led governance may be the status quo within the RFMO framework, it cannot serve as the blueprint for the BBNJ COP, where the priority must shift from resource extraction to ecosystem integrity.

To ensure the BBNJ Agreement fulfills its mandate as a high-ambition conservation tool, it is vital that its governance structure is not undermined by the same industrial fishing pressures seen in RFMOs. We recommend the following safeguards for the first Conference of the Parties:

- Impose a maximum 120 day time limit for the review of sanctuary proposals to prevent RFMO's, and fishing industry interests, from stalling the process. These organisations that currently manage high seas fishing have always protected the interests of the fishing industry, overseen the decimation of biodiversity and destruction of entire ecosystems, and therefore must not be allowed to tie up ocean protection in delays.
- Establish rigorous monitoring of participation within the COP, with specific focus on national delegation composition and associated scientific advisory processes. This is necessary to identify and mitigate the "embedding" of commercial actors who may prioritize short-term extraction over global conservation goals.
- Implement mandatory disclosure of all delegation affiliations, including a clear register of "technical advisors." Transparency must extend to all observer participation and advisory committee roles to ensure that scientific recommendations remain independent from corporate influence and are guided solely by the best available science.

Introduction

The negotiation of the Global Ocean Treaty and the ongoing governance of high seas fisheries through RFMOs represent key areas of contemporary ocean governance. Although these processes are formally intergovernmental, commercial fishing interests are present within RFMO structures with their representatives being embedded in party delegations. RFMOs also participate as observers in surrounding governance discussions.

This report examines the extent and nature of fishing industry involvement in RFMO decision-making over the past five years and in the post-2023 PrepCom processes established under the BBNJ Agreement. The analysis relies exclusively on publicly available documentation and focuses on measurable participation data and documented examples that illustrate how industry actors shape positions and narratives relating to High Seas protection. The research does not attempt to catalogue every instance of engagement but instead highlights clear patterns of participation and influence.

Methodology

This study uses desk-based analysis to examine fishing industry participation and positioning within RFMOs and the PrepCom processes linked to implementation of the Global Ocean Treaty. The research relies exclusively on publicly available sources, including RFMO participant lists and public statements from fishing industry associations.

The RFMO analysis focuses on eight major organisations governing high seas fisheries: the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO), the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC), and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). These were selected because they manage most industrial tuna and high seas fisheries and represent the main fora where distant-water fishing states and industry actors engage in fisheries governance.

The analysis covers RFMO annual meetings between 2021 and 2025, where data was available, alongside the 2024 and 2025 sessions of the BBNJ Preparatory Commission. For the purposes of this analysis, 'fishing industry representatives' include delegates who appear in participants lists under the following entities : fleet operators, vessel owner groups, distant-water fishing corporations, seafood processors, tuna companies, national fishing associations, producer organisations, trade bodies, or gear suppliers. Government officials, intergovernmental organisations, independent academic researchers without commercial ties, and environmental non-governmental organisations were not included in this category.

The study has limitations. It relies on publicly available documentation and does not capture informal negotiations or internal delegation discussions. It is notably important to stress that this study does not analyse fishing industry affiliated representatives' influence back in capitals,

which is probably the strongest primary influence of the industry. Delegate classification is based on stated affiliations and may not reveal indirect industry links. Participation metrics therefore indicate patterns of representation rather than direct causal influence over policy decisions. Particularly significant findings and conclusions are emphasised in bold throughout the text.

Objectives

The research is guided by the following objectives:

1. Quantify the scale of fishing industry participation in RFMO meetings (2021–2025).
2. Examine how industry actors participate within RFMO governance structures.
3. Analyse governance narratives emphasising RFMO's exclusive competence in high seas fisheries management.
4. Assess the relevance of these dynamics for the implementation environment of the BBNJ Agreement.


Findings

1. Mapping fishing industry participation and influence in RFMO and PrepCom processes

1.1 Fishing Industry Representatives Within Key Country Delegations (RFMO Meetings – Past 5 Years)

Fishing industry representatives are routinely embedded within national delegations at global fisheries negotiations. This section presents an overview of fishing industry affiliated representatives embedded within official national delegations at RFMO annual meetings over the past five years, 2021 to 2025. By identifying industry-affiliated delegates listed as part of state delegations rather than external observers, instances where commercial fishing interests are institutionally integrated into formal negotiation structures are captured.

Figure 1. Global map of RFMOs. RFMOs cover more than 90% of the ocean and diverse fisheries, including \$40 Billion in Tuna Annually.



Source: <https://www.pew.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2025/02/how-the-international-community-regulates-fisheries-across-the-ocean>

1.1.1 ICCAT country-Level delegation breakdown, 2021–2025: fishing industry representation within national delegations

The Table 11. ICCAT Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025 (see Appendix 1.) provides a full country-level breakdown for the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) over the five most recent annual meetings, 2021 to 2025. It is presented as an illustrative example of the underlying dataset used to generate the aggregated participation figures included in this report. For each year, the table lists every Contracting Party present, the total size of its delegation, and the number of delegates identified as fishing industry affiliated according to the classification criteria set out in the methodology.

This detailed breakdown allows for granular analysis of how industry representatives are distributed across specific states rather than only at aggregate RFMO level. It makes visible which countries **consistently embed commercial fishing actors within official delegations**, the relative scale of that representation compared to overall delegation size, and variations across years. For example, **large delegations such as the European Union show substantial industry presence in multiple years**, while several states consistently report zero industry-affiliated delegates.

Based on the 2025 ICCAT data provided, the European Union delegation was markedly larger than any other participant. With 146 delegates, the EU alone accounted for roughly 25% of all delegates present (146 out of 587 total). The next largest delegations were significantly smaller - Morocco (37), the United States (27), Canada (23), Ghana (21), and the United Kingdom (21). In absolute terms, the EU delegation was nearly four times larger than the next largest delegation.

The pattern is even more pronounced regarding fishing industry representation. The EU delegation included 64 fishing industry representatives, which represents approximately 38% of all industry representatives recorded (64 out of 167 total). No other delegation approached this level in absolute terms: Ghana had 16 industry representatives, Morocco 12, Senegal 8, and

several others (e.g., Tunisia, Türkiye, Taiwan¹, United States, Panama, South Africa) ranged between 5–6 representatives. While some countries such as Ghana or Panama had a high proportion of industry actors within relatively small delegations, the EU stands out both for the sheer size of its delegation and for the absolute number of industry representatives embedded within it, far exceeding any other participant at the meeting.

Table 11. ICCAT Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025 (see Appendix 1.) therefore serves as a transparent reference example of the full participation mapping approach. Equivalent country-level datasets were compiled for other RFMOs, with summary tables presenting consolidated totals, percentage shares, and recurring country patterns across commissions.

The pattern observed for 2025 is consistent throughout the data for annual ICCAT meetings:

ICCAT 2024

- **EU delegation: 162 members** (largest; next largest: USA 34, Ghana 27).
- **EU industry representatives: 63, 38.9% of the EU delegation.**
- EU industry presence alone exceeded the *total delegation size* of most other members.

ICCAT 2023

- **EU delegation: 137 members** (largest; next largest: USA 36, Egypt 28).
- **EU industry representatives: 49, 35.8% of the EU delegation.**
- EU industry contingent larger than most full national delegations.

ICCAT 2022

- **EU delegation: 118 members** (largest; next largest: USA 38, Tunisia 23).
- **EU industry representatives: 41, 34.7% of the EU delegation.**
- EU industry representation alone comparable to or exceeding entire delegations of major fishing states.

ICCAT 2021

- **EU delegation: 121 members** (largest; next largest: USA 43, Ghana 30).
- **EU industry representatives: 45, 37.2% of the EU delegation.**
- EU industry delegation more than double that of any other participant.

Overall Pattern (2021–2025)

- The **EU consistently fielded the largest delegation.**

¹ RFMO data references Taiwan as Chinese Taipei. Wherever referenced in this report as such, the term is used to indicate how it was used in the original data and does not imply any political position on behalf of the authors.

- Roughly **35–39% of the EU delegation consisted of fishing industry representatives** each year. In absolute terms, the EU consistently had the highest number of industry representatives of any participant.
- In **3 out of 5 years (2021, 2022, 2025)**, the total number of industry representatives exceeded the size of the largest national delegation (including the EU).
- In **all five years**, total industry representatives exceeded the delegation size of any individual *non-EU* country.

1.1.2 Summary tables: Aggregated Fishing Industry Participation Across RFMOs, 2021–2025

The following summary tables consolidate the full country-level datasets into **aggregated commission-wide figures for each RFMO and year**. Rather than listing individual states, these tables present total Contracting Parties, overall delegate numbers, total fishing industry affiliated delegates, percentage shares, main industry categories represented, and the main countries embedding industry actors within their delegations. This format provides a comparable, high-level view of industry presence across commissions and over time, enabling cross-RFMO comparison of participation density and proximity to decision-making processes.

International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas - ICCAT

Table 1. ICCAT Summary Table. Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025.

RFMO	Year	CPCs ² / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ³ / Main CPCs Identified ⁴
ICCAT	2025 ⁵	51 / 587	167 / 28.5%	Fleet operators, national fishing association, seafood processors, trade bodies	24 / European Union - 59⁶ , Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, Türkiye, Panama, South Africa, United States, Canada, China Mainland, Japan, Namibia, Libya
	2024 ⁷	49 / 495	139 / 28.1%		22 / European Union - 63 ,

² ‘CPCs’ in the context of RFMOs stands for Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs are the member states or entities that participate in these international bodies to manage and conserve fish stocks.

³ This refers to the number of countries that had fishing industry representatives as part of their delegation.

⁴ This refers to the countries with the highest number of fishing industry representatives.

⁵ <https://www.iccat.int/DocsComm/PageDocs.php>

⁶ The delegation with the highest number of representatives has been highlighted.

⁷ https://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_24-25-I-1.pdf

				Ghana, Canada, China Mainland, Senegal, Japan, Tunisia, Namibia, Panama, South Africa, United States
	2023 ⁸	48 / 533	138 / 25.9%	20 / European Union - 46 , Ghana, Senegal, Morocco, Japan, Canada, China Mainland, South Africa, Tunisia, Republic of Korea, Türkiye, Panama
	2022 ⁹	51 / 523	138 / 26.4%	23 / European Union - 32 , Türkiye, Tunisia, Ghana, Morocco, Canada, Japan, United States, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Libya, Brazil, Taiwan
	2021 ¹⁰	50 / 509	136 / 26.7%	21 / European Union - 41 , Ghana, Tunisia, Japan, United States, Senegal, Morocco, Canada, Panama

Between 2021 and 2025, fishing industry–affiliated delegates at ICCAT annual meetings consistently constituted around 27% of total participation, fluctuating within a narrow range of 25.9% to 28.5%, which indicates a stable and institutionalised level of private-sector integration within national delegations. Industry representation is geographically broad, with between 20 and 24 CPCs including industry actors each year, but it is notably concentrated among major fishing powers, particularly the European Union, which regularly contributes the highest number of industry-affiliated delegates. The categories represented remain consistent across the period, primarily fleet operators, national fishing associations, seafood processors and trade bodies, suggesting continuity in the segments of the tuna value chain most directly embedded in ICCAT governance processes.

⁸ https://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_22-23_II-1.pdf

⁹ https://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_22-23_I-1.pdf

¹⁰ https://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_20-21_II-1.pdf

- **Indian Ocean Tuna Commission - IOTC**

Table 2. IOTC Summary Table. Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025.

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ¹¹ / Main CPCs Identified ¹²
IOTC	2025 ¹ ₃	32 / 239	47 / 19.7%	Fleet operators, national fishing associations, seafood processors, tuna companies, vessel owner groups	14 / European Union - 21 , Japan, Seychelles, Republic of Korea, Mauritius, Australia, South Africa, Madagascar, China Mainland, Indonesia, France (OT), Tanzania
	2024 ¹ ₄	33 / 279	63 / 22.6%	Fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups, gear suppliers, consultancy-linked industry representatives	16 / European Union - 20 , Seychelles, Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea, Mauritius, United Kingdom, Indonesia, China Mainland, France (OT)
	2023 ¹ ₅	33 / 248	58 / 23.4%	Fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups, gear suppliers, trade associations	16 / European Union - 16 , Seychelles, Japan, Mauritius, Australia, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, China Mainland
	2022 ¹ ₆	30 / 377	88 / 23.3%	Fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups, export associations, gear suppliers	10 / Australia, China Mainland, European Union - 25 , Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, United Kingdom
	2021 ¹ ₇	30 / 420	116 / 27.6%	Fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups, shipping firms, export	11 / Australia, China Mainland, European Union - 29 , Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom

¹¹ This refers to the number of countries that had fishing industry representatives as part of their delegation.

¹² This refers to the countries with the highest number of fishing industry representatives.

¹³ <https://iotc.org/documents/Com/29/RE>

¹⁴ <https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024/07/IOTC-2024-S28-RE.pdf>

¹⁵ <https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2023/07/IOTC-2023-S27-RE.pdf>

¹⁶ <https://iotc.org/meetings/26th-session-indian-ocean-tuna-commission>

¹⁷ <https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/10/IOTC-2021-S25-RE.pdf>

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ¹¹ / Main CPCs Identified ¹²
				associations, purse seine associations	

Between 2021 and 2025, fishing industry–affiliated delegates at IOTC annual meetings averaged approximately 23% of total participation, with representation declining from a high of 27.6% in 2021 to just under 20% in 2025, suggesting a gradual reduction in proportional industry presence over the period. Although between 10 and 16 CPCs per year included industry actors, participation appears concentrated among key Indian Ocean fishing states and distant-water fleets, particularly the European Union, Japan, Seychelles, the Republic of Korea and Mauritius. The categories represented are consistently centred on fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors and vessel owner groups, with occasional inclusion of gear suppliers and consultancy-linked representatives, **indicating direct value-chain engagement in IOTC governance processes.**

- **Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna - CCSBT**

Table 3. CCSBT Summary Table. Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025.

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ¹⁸ / Main CPCs Identified ¹⁹
CCSBT	2025 ²⁰	6 / 94	25 / 26.6%	Fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups, shipping firms, export associations, purse	5 / Australia - 8 , Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, South Africa
	2024 ²¹	6 / 55	18 / 32.7%		4 / Australia, Indonesia, Japan - 8 , Republic of Korea

¹⁸ This refers to the number of countries that had fishing industry representatives as part of their delegation.

¹⁹ This refers to the countries with the highest number of fishing industry representatives.

²⁰

https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/default/files/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_32/report_of_CCSBT32.pdf

²¹

https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/default/files/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_31/report_of_CCSBT31.pdf

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ¹⁸ / Main CPCs Identified ¹⁹
	2023 ² ₂	6 / 78	24 / 30.8%	seine associations, longline associations	4 / Australia, Japan -11 , Republic of Korea, Indonesia
	2022 ² ₃	6 / 113	43 / 38.1%		5 / Japan - 20 , Republic of Korea, Australia, Indonesia, South Africa
	2021 ² ₄	6 / 120	48 / 40.0%		5 / Japan - 25 , Republic of Korea, Australia, Indonesia, South Africa

Between 2021 and 2025, fishing industry–affiliated delegates at CCSBT annual meetings averaged approximately 34% of total participation, making it proportionally one of the most industry-integrated RFMOs in this dataset. Although representation declined from 40% in 2021 to 26.6% in 2025, industry actors consistently constituted more than a quarter of all delegates, reflecting deep integration within a relatively small membership of six CPCs. Participation is concentrated among core southern bluefin tuna fishing states, particularly Japan, Australia, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea, with industry presence embedded across most members each year. The categories represented are consistently centred on fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors and longline associations, indicating direct harvesting-sector engagement in CCSBT governance processes rather than peripheral commercial representation.

²²

https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/default/files/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_30/report_of_CCSBT30.pdf

²³

https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/default/files/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_29/report_of_CCSBT29.pdf

²⁴

https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/default/files/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_28/report_of_CCSBT28.pdf

- **Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission - WCPFC**

Table 4. WCPFC Summary Table. Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025.

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ²⁵ / Main CPCs Identified ²⁶
WCPFC	2025	N/A ²⁷			
	2024 ²⁸ ₈	26 / 463	142 / 30.7%	Fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups, shipping firms, export associations, purse seine associations, longline associations, gear suppliers	17 / Japan, China Mainland, Republic of Korea - 12 , Taiwan, Philippines, United States, Papua New Guinea
	2023 ²⁹ ₉	26 / 285	66 / 23.2%	Fleet operators, tuna fishing companies, seafood processors, vessel owners, purse seine associations, longline associations, national fishing industry federations, tuna trading firms, fishery cooperatives	14 / Japan - 15 , China Mainland, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, United States, European Union
	2022 ³⁰ ₀	30 / 484	162 / 33.5%	Fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups, purse seine associations, longline associations, export companies	15 / Japan, China Mainland, Republic of Korea - 13 , Taiwan, United States, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands

²⁵ This refers to the number of countries that had fishing industry representatives as part of their delegation.

²⁶ This refers to the countries with the highest number of fishing industry representatives.

²⁷ Not accessible.

²⁸ <https://meetings.wcpfc.int/file/17143/download>

²⁹ <https://meetings.wcpfc.int/file/14767/download>

³⁰ <https://meetings.wcpfc.int/file/12419/download>

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ²⁵ / Main CPCs Identified ²⁶
	2021 ³¹	N/A			

Between 2022 and 2024 (data for 2021 and 2025 unavailable), fishing industry–affiliated delegates at WCPFC annual meetings averaged approximately 29% of total participation, with representation fluctuating from 23.2% in 2023 to 33.5% in 2022, indicating a consistently high but variable level of private-sector integration. Industry participation spans between 14 and 17 CPCs per meeting and is concentrated among major Pacific fishing powers, particularly Japan, China Mainland, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and the United States, alongside Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. The categories represented consistently centre on fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors, purse seine and longline associations, reflecting **direct harvesting-sector and vertically integrated value-chain engagement within WCPFC governance processes**. In simple terms, this means that the companies and organisations directly involved in catching, processing, and selling fish - especially large industrial fishing fleets - are regularly present within WCPFC meetings, often as part of national delegations.

- **South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation - SPRFMO**

Table 5. SPRFMO Summary Table. Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025.

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ³² / Main CPCs Identified ³³
SPRFMO	2025 ³⁴	16 / 174	49 / 28.2%	Fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors, vessel owner	8 / Chile - 38, Peru, European Union, China Mainland, Republic of Korea

³¹ Report online but data not able to be reviewed

³² This refers to the number of countries that had fishing industry representatives as part of their delegation.

³³ This refers to the countries with the highest number of fishing industry representatives.

³⁴

<https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/13th-Commission-2025/Reports/COMM13-Report-Annex-02-List-of-Participants.pdf>

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ³² / Main CPCs Identified ³³
	2024 ³⁵	15 / 148	37 / 25.0%	groups, fisheries cooperatives, export associations, purse seine associations, longline associations	8 / Chile - 14 , Ecuador, European Union, China Mainland, Peru
	2023 ³⁶	14 / 219	54 / 24.7%		9 / Chile - 24 , Peru, European Union, Republic of Korea, Ecuador
	2022 ³⁷	13 / 181	41 / 22.7%		8 / Chile, European Union - 9 , Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Peru
	2021 ³⁸	13 / 176	46 / 26.1%		9 / Chile, Peru - 10 , European Union, Republic of Korea, Taiwan

Between 2021 and 2025, the fishing industry–affiliated delegates at SPRFMO annual meetings averaged approximately 25% of total participation, fluctuating within a relatively narrow range of 22.7% to 28.2%, indicating a stable and embedded level of private-sector engagement. Industry representation spans 8 to 9 CPCs per meeting and is concentrated among key South Pacific fishing states, particularly Chile and Peru, alongside distant-water actors such as fleets from the European Union, China Mainland and the Republic of Korea. The categories represented are consistently centred on fleet operators, tuna associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups and fisheries cooperatives, reflecting **direct harvesting-sector and export-oriented value-chain participation within SPRFMO governance processes.**

35

<https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/12th-Commission-2024/Report-and-Annexes/Annex-2-COMM12-List-of-Participants.pdf>

36

<https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/11th-Commission-2022-COMM11/COMM11-Report/Annex-2-List-of-Participants-final-rev1.pdf>

37

<https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/10th-Commission-2022-COMM10/Report-Annexes/ANNEX-2-List-of-Participants.pdf>

38

<https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/01-COMM/9th-Commission-2021-COMM9/Report/Annex-2-List-of-Participants.pdf>

North Pacific Fisheries Commission - NPFC

Table 6. NPFC Summary Table. Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025.

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ³⁹ / Main CPCs Identified ⁴⁰
NPFC	2025 ⁴ ₁	9 / 149	52 / 34.9%	Distant-water fishing companies, squid associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups, fisheries corporations, industry federations	6 / Japan - 17 , China Mainland, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Russian Federation, European Union
	2024 ⁴ ₂	9 / 136	45 / 33.1%	Distant-water fishing corporations, t squid associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups, industry federations	6 / Japan - 10 , China Mainland, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Russian Federation, European Union, United States
	2023 ⁴ ₃	9 / 123	38 / 30.9%		6 / Japan, China Mainland - 6 , Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Russian Federation, European Union
	2022 ⁴ ₄	N/A			
	2021 ⁴ ₅	8 / 108	29 / 26.9%	Distant-water fishing companies, squid associations, seafood processors, vessel owner groups, industry federations	6 / Japan - 11, China Mainland, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Russian Federation, Canada

Between 2021 and 2025, fishing industry–affiliated delegates at NPFC annual meetings averaged approximately 31–32% of total participation (based on available years), increasing from 26.9% in 2021 to 34.9% in 2025, indicating a clear upward trend in proportional industry

³⁹ This refers to the number of countries that had fishing industry representatives as part of their delegation.

⁴⁰ This refers to the countries with the highest number of fishing industry representatives.

⁴¹ <https://www.npfc.int/sites/default/files/2025-12/COM09%20Final%20Report.pdf>

⁴² <https://www.npfc.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/NPFC-2024-COM08-Final%20Report.pdf>

⁴³ <https://www.npfc.int/sites/default/files/2023-05/COM07%20Final%20Report.pdf>

⁴⁴ There is no final report accessible online

⁴⁵ <https://www.npfc.int/sites/default/files/2021-04/COM06%20Final%20Report%20Rev.%201.pdf>

presence. Industry participation is consistently embedded across six CPCs per meeting and is concentrated among major North Pacific fishing powers, particularly Japan, China Mainland, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and the Russian Federation, with the European Union also present in recent years. **The categories represented are heavily oriented toward fishing companies, squid associations, seafood processors and industry federations, reflecting strong harvesting-sector and corporate integration within NPFC governance processes.**

- **Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation - NAFO**

Table 7. NAFO Summary Table. Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025.

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ⁴⁶ / Main CPCs Identified ⁴⁷
NAFO	2025 ⁴⁸	12 / 160	41 / 25.6%	Commercial fishing companies, Vessel owners, Seafood processors, Industry associations, Fisheries federations, Commercial sector representatives	9 / Canada, European Union - 15
	2024 ⁴⁹	11 / 147	32 / 21.8%		8 / European Union - 14 , Canada
	2023 ⁵⁰	12 / 171	46 / 26.9%		10 / European Union - 22 , Canada, Denmark (Faroe Islands and Greenland)
	2022 ⁵¹	14 / 214	61 / 28.5%	Commercial fishing companies, Vessel owners, Seafood processors, Fishing associations, Producer organisations, Fishermen's unions	11 / European Union - 21 , Canada, United States
	2021 ⁵²	14 / 206	58 / 28.2%		11 / European Union - 16 , Canada, United States

⁴⁶ This refers to the number of countries that had fishing industry representatives as part of their delegation.

⁴⁷ This refers to the countries with the highest number of fishing industry representatives.

⁴⁸ <https://www.nafo.int/Portals/0/PDFs/COM/2025/comdoc25-18.pdf>

⁴⁹ <https://www.nafo.int/Portals/0/PDFs/COM/2024/comdoc24-25.pdf>

⁵⁰ <https://www.nafo.int/Portals/0/PDFs/COM/2023/comdoc23-28.pdf>

⁵¹ <https://www.nafo.int/Portals/0/PDFs/COM/2022/comdoc22-27.pdf>

⁵² <https://www.nafo.int/Portals/0/PDFs/COM/2021/comdoc21-21REV.pdf>

Between 2021 and 2025, the fishing industry–affiliated delegates at NAFO annual meetings averaged approximately 26% of total participation, fluctuating between 21.8% and 28.5%, indicating a consistently substantial private-sector presence. While between 8 and 11 CPCs per year included industry actors, representation is clearly concentrated among Canada and the European Union, with occasional participation from the United States and Denmark (Faroe Islands and Greenland). The categories represented are predominantly commercial fishing companies, vessel owners, seafood processors and producer or industry associations, reflecting **strong integration of harvesting and processing interests within NAFO governance structures.**

- **Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission - IATTC**

Table 8. IATTC Summary Table. Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025.

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ⁵³ / Main CPCs Identified ⁵⁴
IATTC	2025 ⁵⁵	N/A			
	2024 ⁵⁶	18 / 85	17 / 20.0%	Tuna Associations, Overseas Fisheries Associations, Gear Suppliers, Fisheries Cooperatives, National Industry Associations, Recreational Fishing	8 / China Mainland, Japan, Ecuador - 12 , EU, Taiwan
	2023 ⁵⁷	16 / 74	22 / 29.7%	Tuna Associations, Overseas Fisheries Associations, Fleet Operators, Purse Seine Associations, Private Fishing Companies	9 / Japan, Republic of Korea, Ecuador, China Mainland, European Union - 7
	2022 ⁵⁸	20 / 158	60 / 38.0%	Tuna Associations, Fleet Operators, Seafood Processors, National Industry Associations, Longline Associations, Purse Seine Associations, Exporters, Vessel Operators	16 / Ecuador - 16 , Mexico, Japan, Peru, EU
	2021 ⁵⁹	20 / 154	68 / 44.2%	Tuna Associations, Fleet Operators, Seafood Processors, Vessel Owners, Industry Associations, Longline	16 / Ecuador - 15 , Mexico, United States, European Union, Japan

⁵³ This refers to the number of countries that had fishing industry representatives as part of their delegation.

⁵⁴ This refers to the countries with the highest number of fishing industry representatives.

⁵⁵ The report is not accessible.

⁵⁶

https://www.iatcc.org/GetAttachment/36b55902-5b93-457e-ada1-3683bec1ef84/IATTC-102-MINS_102nd-Meeting-of-the-IATTC.pdf

⁵⁷

https://www.iatcc.org/GetAttachment/ab314686-7c57-479a-9835-c68a442cae22/IATTC-101-MINS_101st-Meeting-of-the-IATTC.pdf

⁵⁸

https://www.iatcc.org/GetAttachment/7873b95b-4575-494e-af6a-2934cae6c348/IATTC-100-MINS_100th-Meeting-of-the-IATTC.pdf

⁵⁹

[https://www.iatcc.org/GetAttachment/17785fd3-a64b-47ff-9649-42f697d2f068/IATTC-98b-MINS_98th-Meeting-of-the-IATTC-\(Resumed\).pdf](https://www.iatcc.org/GetAttachment/17785fd3-a64b-47ff-9649-42f697d2f068/IATTC-98b-MINS_98th-Meeting-of-the-IATTC-(Resumed).pdf)

RFMO	Year	CPCs / Total Delegates	Industry Delegates (No. / Percentage of Total)	Industry Categories	No. of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. CPCs Including Fishing Industry Delegates ⁵³ / Main CPCs Identified ⁵⁴
				Associations, Purse Seine Associations, Export Associations	

Between 2021 and 2024, fishing industry–affiliated delegates at IATTC annual meetings averaged approximately 33% of total participation, fluctuating between 44.2 % and 20%, indicating a significant but declining private-sector presence over the period. While between 8 and 16 CPCs per year included industry representatives, **participation is clearly concentrated among major tuna fishing states, particularly Ecuador, as well as Mexico, Japan, the European Union, China Mainland and the Republic of Korea.** The industry actors represented span tuna associations, fleet operators, purse seine and longline associations, seafood processors, vessel operators and exporters, **reflecting the strong integration of harvesting, processing and trade interests within IATTC governance structures.**

Overall observations across RFMOs (2021-2025)

Industry participation in fisheries governance is concentrated among a small group of major fishing powers. Industry participation is consistently significant across RFMOs, though it varies by commission. In several bodies, industry representation as a percentage of total delegates typically falls within the ~20–30% range, including ICCAT (~26–29% across 2021–2025), NAFO (~22–29% across 2021–2025), and SPRFMO (~23–28% across 2021–2025). Others are higher, such as CCSBT (~27–40% across 2021–2025) and NPFC (~27–35% across available years). Some commissions show sharp variation, notably IATTC, where industry participation declines from 44.2% (2021) to 20.0% (2024). **Overall, industry presence is not peripheral but embedded in many RFMOs, with most representatives participating within national delegations rather than as independent observers.**

Trendlines differ by RFMO rather than following a single global trajectory. IOTC shows a decline from 27.6% (2021) to 19.7% (2025), and CCSBT declines from 40.0% (2021) to 26.6% (2025). By contrast, NPFC increases from 26.9% (2021) to 34.9% (2025). WCPFC remains comparatively high but volatile across available years (23.2% in 2023, 33.5% in 2022, 30.7% in 2024). **These differences likely reflect institutional dynamics, stock-specific issues, and regional political contexts.**

Industry participation is concentrated within major fishing powers rather than evenly distributed across RFMO membership. The European Union repeatedly embeds the highest number of industry representatives in commissions such as ICCAT, IOTC and NAFO. In Pacific bodies, Japan, China Mainland, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and often the United States

regularly include industry actors within their delegations. Regional fishing states also dominate in specific commissions, such as Ecuador in IATTC and Chile and Peru in SPRFMO. This reflects the concentration of industry participation within states holding the greatest commercial and regulatory stakes in the fisheries governed by these organisations.

Across the commissions examined, many member states attend without industry representatives, indicating that private-sector access to RFMO processes is largely mediated through a relatively small group of major fishing powers. Smaller commissions can show very high proportional participation even with modest numbers. For example, CCSBT, with only six CPCs, records industry participation rates of 40% in 2021 and 38.1% in 2022, suggesting deep integration of industry actors within a limited number of delegations.

Data gaps affect cross-RFMO averages, as some years were unavailable (WCPFC 2025 and 2021; IATTC 2025). Based on available data across the eight RFMOs examined, the indicative cross-RFMO average industry participation rate is approximately 28–29% of total delegates. This means roughly one in four to one in three participants at annual RFMO meetings is industry-affiliated. While some commissions cluster around 23–27% and others reach 30–35%, and outlier years such as IATTC at 44.2% in 2021 raise averages, industry participation remains substantial even where proportional shares decline.

Across the dataset, the delegations embedding the highest numbers of industry-affiliated delegates are consistently major fishing powers. The EU most frequently contributes the largest number of industry representatives across multiple RFMOs, particularly ICCAT, IOTC and NAFO, while Japan plays a similar role in Pacific commissions such as CCSBT, WCPFC and NPFC. In SPRFMO and IATTC, the highest numbers are often contributed by key regional fishing states such as Chile, Peru and Ecuador.

1.1.3 Fishing Industry Participation in BBNJ Preparatory Commission Processes, 2024-2025

For the BBNJ PrepCom 1 and 2 in 2025 there are no publicly available participation lists, however two representatives of IATTC RFMO attended the June 2024 PrepCom organisational meeting.⁶⁰ As a result, information on participants was compiled from multiple publicly available sources, including UN meeting webpages, written statements, organisational records, and side-event listings. These sources were cross-referenced to identify participating organisations and delegates where possible. The available documentation still provides valuable insight into the range of actors present and the types of organisations engaging with the process. In contrast to RFMO processes, no fishing industry affiliated delegates were included in publicly available listed national delegations in the 2024 and 2025 PrepCom sessions.

⁶⁰ <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4059140?v=pdf>

An interview with an expert observer⁶¹ who attended recent PrepCom sessions suggests that, rather than engaging visibly within the PrepCom meetings themselves, **fishing industry actors may exert influence primarily through national governments and through RFMO processes, with state positions reflecting prior domestic or sectoral consultations rather than direct in-room industry advocacy.** Data from RFMO annual meetings, where industry participation is formally structured and often numerically significant within delegations (see Chapter 1), may support this interpretation by indicating that sector engagement is more institutionalised in RFMO settings than in the PrepCom process.

Publicly available documentation identifies one clearly fishing industry-affiliated individual present during the 2024–2025 PrepCom process under the BBNJ Agreement: Ivan López van der Veen, Chair of the International Coalition of Fisheries Associations (ICFA), who appeared as a panellist at a fisheries-focused side event during PrepCom 2 (August 2025) at UN Headquarters.

This is supported by the official FAO concept note listing him as a panel participant⁶² and corroborated by contemporaneous media coverage naming him among speakers at a panel discussion held “on the sidelines” of PrepCom 2⁶³. An additional post-meeting write-up reiterates his participation in the fisheries-themed side event⁶⁴. No comparably specific, publicly verifiable naming of fishing industry-affiliated individuals was identified for the June 2024 organisational meeting or PrepCom 1 (April 2025), and no evidence was found of industry representatives formally listed within state delegations.

Beyond this side-event participation, the evidence base indicates active engagement by fisheries governance institutions rather than overt industry representation in delegations. For example, the WCPFC stated it was represented at both PrepCom meetings⁶⁵, and the High Seas Alliance reported that many RFMOs were present and actively engaging at PrepCom 2⁶⁶. UN registration materials confirm that participant lists are compiled but do not categorise delegates by sector⁶⁷.

Overall, the documented evidence suggests limited visible industry presence within the formal PrepCom process itself, with the strongest confirmed signal being ICFA’s chair participating in a

⁶¹ The interviewee requested anonymity.

⁶²

https://www.fao.org/fishery/services/storage/fs/fishery/documents/ABNJ/FisheriesandBBNJ_conceptNote.pdf

⁶³ <https://psmnews.mv/en/164051>

⁶⁴

<https://oceanequityresearch.org/news/how-will-the-new-deep-sea-treaty-join-the-existing-ocean-governance-framework/>

⁶⁵ <https://meetings.wcpfc.int/file/19864/download>

⁶⁶ <https://highseasalliance.org/treatytracker/?meeting=prepcom-2&utm>

⁶⁷ https://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/BBNJ/RegistInfoPrepComOrgIGOs.pdf

side event, while **broader fisheries-sector engagement appears primarily channelled through RFMOs and intergovernmental bodies rather than explicitly industry-branded delegations.**

2. From RFMOs to BBNJ: Evaluating industry narratives and the risk of institutional capture

This section documents and analyses publicly available evidence of how fishing industry actors and aligned stakeholders have sought to shape narratives, positions and policy expectations regarding high seas conservation.

It examines both the apparent lobbying strategies and public statements of fishing industry lobbyists aimed at strengthening the authority of RFMOs or justifying the limitations placed on ambitious measures to protect the high seas.

It thus highlights the risks that an excessive influence of the fishing industry on COP institutions could pose to biodiversity conservation issues in the high seas.

2.1 Defending RFMO Exclusivity to Prevent Integration of High Seas Fisheries into Broader Biodiversity Governance

A central and recurring strategy used by fishing industry actors over the past five years has been the **reinforcement of RFMO exclusivity, positioning RFMOs as the sole competent and sufficient authorities for managing fisheries in areas beyond national jurisdiction.** This narrative has appeared both within RFMO negotiations themselves and in post-2023 discussions surrounding implementation of the BBNJ Agreement.⁶⁸ **The practical effect is to limit the ability of broader high seas protection measures, particularly MPAs, to impose binding fisheries restrictions without RFMO consent.**

Across recent annual meetings of the five tuna RFMOs (ICCAT, IATTC, IOTC, CCSBT, WCPFC), publicly available commission reports and meeting summaries **consistently emphasise RFMO mandates, competence, and science-based management as the sole**

⁶⁸

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343926166_How_transparent_are_RFMOs_Achievements_and_challenges

basis for fisheries governance, implicitly framing external biodiversity mechanisms as duplicative or unnecessary. This exclusivity framing became particularly consequential following adoption of the BBNJ Agreement in 2023, which provides that **the treaty shall be interpreted and applied in a manner that does not “undermine relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies.”**⁶⁹ During negotiations, the industrial fishing sector explicitly invoked this concern. Javier Garat, President of Europêche and Vice Chair of the International Coalition of Fisheries Associations (ICFA), stated: **“We believe that high seas fishing is already well-managed by the RFMOs, and we do not need any other institution to regulate it,”** warning that the treaty **“should not give rise to duplications in fishery management matters.”**⁷⁰ With large parts of the high seas overlapping with RFMO areas of competence, such statements illustrate how **the ‘non-undermining’ clause became a focal point for protecting existing RFMO authority against potential encroachment by the new treaty framework.**

However, as outlined in Greenpeace International’s 'Un-tangled' report⁷¹, this clause (Article 5.2) must be interpreted through a 'high-ambition' lens rather than a restrictive one. Greenpeace posits that 'non-undermining' does not imply that the BBNJ COP is subservient to existing bodies like RFMOs, which have historically failed to meet biodiversity targets. Instead, Article 5 should be understood as a mandate for coherence and coordination, where the BBNJ Treaty sets a global floor for conservation that sectoral bodies are expected to support. Furthermore, regarding Article 22 (Environmental Impact Assessments), the Greenpeace interpretation emphasizes that the BBNJ Agreement provides the COP with a critical oversight role. Even if an activity falls under the jurisdiction of a sectoral body (like an RFMO), if that body’s standards are lower than those set by the BBNJ Treaty, the 'higher standard' of BBNJ should prevail.

The mechanism through which this strategy operates is primarily narrative and institutional rather than procedural obstruction. By repeatedly asserting RFMO effectiveness and legal competence in public records, industry actors shape the baseline assumption in negotiations: that fisheries governance gaps are best addressed internally through incremental RFMO reform, rather than through binding biodiversity instruments with cross-sectoral authority.⁷² **This arguably reduces political appetite for ambitious high seas MPAs that would directly restrict industrial fishing activity without RFMO approval.**

The limiting effect on high seas protection is structural. If biodiversity bodies defer to RFMOs for fisheries restrictions, and if RFMOs remain consensus-driven and susceptible to economic and political pressures from major fishing states, then ambitious

⁶⁹

<https://www.un.org/bbnjagreement/sites/default/files/2024-08/Text%20of%20the%20Agreement%20in%20English.pdf>

⁷⁰ <https://infofish.org/v4/index.php/bbnj-rfmo-s-and-market-new-challenges-for-sustainable-tuna-fisheries?>

⁷¹ <https://www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-international-stateless/2024/06/43f396d8-untangled-rfmo-report.pdf>

⁷² <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X25002477>

ecosystem-level protection becomes contingent on RFMO agreement. In practice, this reinforces sectoral fragmentation and preserves fishing access, even as broader biodiversity objectives advance.

This strategy does not require overt opposition to conservation. Instead, it operates by elevating RFMO primacy as both legally required and practically sufficient. The result is a narrowing of the operational scope of high seas protection, especially where industrial fishing impacts are central to biodiversity loss.

2.2 Using Scientific Uncertainty and Technical Process to Delay or Dilute Precautionary Measures

A recurring pattern across RFMO negotiations from 2021–2025 has been the use of scientific uncertainty, modelling complexity, and extended technical review processes that delay or narrow conservation measures that could restrict fishing activity on the high seas. Rather than opposing proposals outright, industry-aligned delegations emphasise the need for additional stock assessments, updated modelling, management strategy evaluation (MSE) refinement, or further intersessional scientific work before precautionary action is adopted. **The effect is to shift decision-making from precautionary protection toward prolonged technical review cycles.**

For ICCAT, the 28th Regular Meeting 2023 report shows repeated emphasis on harvest strategy development and further scientific evaluation before adopting stronger measures for tropical tunas and other stocks. Decisions were frequently linked to SCRS review timelines and additional modelling work rather than immediate precautionary spatial or effort restrictions.⁷³ IOTC Commission reports from 2022–2024 reflect repeated referrals of contentious conservation proposals to the Scientific Committee for additional technical analysis before final adoption, particularly in relation to stock rebuilding plans and harvest control rules.⁷⁴ NAFO, SPRFMO, and NPFC, Commission reports between 2021–2024 show precautionary closures and stock-specific catch adjustments frequently debated in light of updated stock assessments and calls for improved data before strengthening measures.⁷⁵

There has been resistance in NPFC to close the Emperor Seamounts - a recognized EBSA⁷⁶ - to bottom trawling despite proposals to that effect by the US. Similarly, SPRFMO failed to close vulnerable marine ecosystems to bottom trawling under the pressure of New-Zealand who is the main fishing power in the area⁷⁷.

⁷³ <https://www.iccat.int/com2023/index.htm#>

⁷⁴ <https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024/03/IOTC-2024-SC27-R%5BE%5D.pdf>

⁷⁵ https://www.nafo.int/Portals/0/PDFs/meets/2023/AMR23/NAFO_AMR_2023.pdf

⁷⁶ <https://www.cbd.int/marine/ebsa/booklet-04-np-en.pdf>

⁷⁷

<https://news.mongabay.com/2025/02/new-zealand-blocks-tighter-trawling-rules-at-south-pacific-fisheries-meeting/>

Across these RFMOs, the common narrative recorded in official documents is that measures must be grounded in updated scientific assessment and model validation before adoption. While science-based management is foundational to RFMO governance, **the repeated deferral of precautionary or spatial restrictions pending additional modelling effectively delays high seas protection.** This pattern operates within formal procedure and does not appear as overt resistance; however, **its effect is to maintain current levels of fishing pressure while technical processes continue.**

2.3 Economic and Food Security Framing to Resist High Seas Restrictions

In RFMO negotiations between 2021 and 2025, industry actors and industry-aligned delegations have routinely employed economic and food security framing to condition the ambition of conservation measures that could meaningfully restrict fishing activity on the high seas. Within ICCAT, discussions around catch limits and multi-annual conservation plans repeatedly referenced the need to balance stock rebuilding programmes with the economic viability of fleets and associated socio-economic concerns, with several Contracting Parties emphasising “the socio-economic importance of tuna fisheries” in justifying moderated management measures rather than more precautionary spatial closures. Independent analyses of ICCAT politics note that groups such as OSPESCA stress the socio-economic importance of purse seine tuna fishing for member states, illustrating how economic interests are woven into negotiation coalitions that resist tighter restrictions.⁷⁸

Similarly, in the WCPFC 21st Regular Session summary, the Chair referenced the necessity of balancing stock conservation with the economic realities of members whose communities depend on high seas fisheries for income and employment.⁷⁹

While BBNJ PrepCom/Intergovernmental Conference documents do not contain direct recorded interventions by formal industry bodies, **the economic framing developed within RFMO negotiations was echoed in state positions during the treaty negotiations.** Several major fishing states repeatedly argued in PrepCom sessions that high seas fisheries should remain within RFMO competence and that economic and food security considerations must guide any conservation measure affecting industrial fleets.⁸⁰ **This convergence is notable: the language advanced by distant-water fishing states closely mirrored the concerns articulated by industry representatives,** particularly regarding the protection of RFMO mandates and the avoidance of regulatory duplication, **indicating a clear alignment between state and private fishing sector positions on institutional authority and economic prioritisation.**

⁷⁸ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X25002465?>

⁷⁹

https://www.wpcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/06.1-FINAL_WCPFC21-Summary-Report_14March_ForPosting_0.pdf?

⁸⁰ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X25002465?>

2.4 Embedding Industry within Technical and Advisory Structures

A further documented strategy through which fishing industry players shape positions within RFMO negotiations is embedding within technical committees, advisory bodies, and official national delegations. Unlike the BBNJ PrepCom process, where only states formally negotiated, a common practice within RFMOs is that governments allow industry representatives to participate as members of state delegations (as seen in the above tables included in this report). **This institutional design enables industry actors to influence negotiation narratives from within the governance process itself and has largely contributed to the RFMOs' failure to preserve fish stocks and ecosystems vulnerable to certain fishing techniques such as bottom trawling.**

Publicly available participant lists from recent sessions of ICCAT, WCPFC, IOTC, and IATTC show industry association representatives listed as members of national delegations rather than external observers. **This arrangement gives industry actors access to negotiation drafting discussions, working groups, and consensus-building processes that shape conservation outcomes.**

Scientific Committee structures provide another avenue of influence. RFMO scientific bodies rely on stock assessment modelling, management strategy evaluation, and reference point frameworks. **Industry-affiliated experts frequently participate in these technical processes, either directly or through data provision and advisory engagement.**⁸¹

The mechanism of this strategy is institutional proximity rather than overt opposition. By participating inside delegation structures and technical committees, industry actors shape baseline assumptions about stock health, management measures, and the necessity of precautionary spatial measures. **Conservation proposals that extend beyond existing RFMO management frameworks can therefore be framed as unnecessary, premature, or inconsistent with established science.**

2.5 Promoting Voluntary Sustainability and Certification as Alternatives

Another strategy used by fishing industry players within RFMO processes, and echoed in surrounding discourse, has been the promotion of voluntary sustainability initiatives and certification schemes as evidence that binding high seas restrictions are unnecessary. **Rather than opposing conservation outright, industry actors foreground existing harvest control rules, market certification, traceability systems, and corporate commitments to argue that tuna fisheries are already effectively managed within RFMO frameworks. Certification bodies such as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) regularly reference RFMO management measures as evidence of sustainability in tuna fisheries operating on the high seas, reinforcing the narrative that existing frameworks are delivering conservation outcomes.**⁸²

⁸¹ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X25002477>

⁸² <https://www.msc.org/about-the-msc/our-strategy>

The mechanism here is **substitution framing**. By presenting **voluntary certification, corporate commitments, and incremental RFMO reform as sufficient, industry actors shape negotiation narratives away from binding, ecosystem-based high seas protection and toward technical refinement of existing management tools**. This approach does not reject biodiversity protection; instead, it narrows its operational scope by arguing that additional treaty-based spatial restrictions are redundant.

2.6 Public Statements and Positions of Industrial Fishing Representatives on the Global Ocean Treaty

Publicly available statements from both industrial fishing representatives and RFMO bodies demonstrate a consistent emphasis on preserving RFMO authority over high seas fisheries in the context of the Global Ocean Treaty. Europêche, representing the European fishing industry, publicly stressed that the new treaty must respect and build upon existing fisheries management systems and avoid duplicating or undermining RFMO mandates.⁸³ In its statement entitled ‘New treaty for High Seas must respect international fisheries management’⁸⁴ Europêche argued that fisheries in areas beyond national jurisdiction are already effectively managed through RFMOs and that the Global Ocean Treaty should complement rather than regulate those structures. This public position directly promotes RFMO primacy and frames fisheries governance as outside the treaty’s independent regulatory reach.

Similarly, the ISSF, representing major global tuna companies, consistently emphasises in its RFMO engagement materials that tuna fisheries are governed through established science-based RFMO frameworks. ISSF’s governance publications highlight harvest control rules, compliance monitoring, and management strategy evaluation as the core mechanisms for sustainable fisheries management, reinforcing the narrative that RFMO processes are the appropriate venue for fisheries regulation rather than cross-sectoral biodiversity instruments.⁸⁵ Notably, ISSF has not publicly opposed the BBNJ Agreement; rather, its published materials focus on strengthening existing RFMO science-based management systems, suggesting an inferred institutional preference for sectoral governance rather than an explicit rejection of the Global Ocean Treaty.

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<https://europeche.chil.me/post/new-treaty-for-high-seas-must-respect-international-fisheries-management-429834>

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<https://europeche.chil.me/post/new-treaty-for-high-seas-must-respect-international-fisheries-management-429834>

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<https://www.issf-foundation.org/tuna-stocks-and-management/fisheries-management/regional-fisheries-management-organizations-rfmos/>

A more nuanced industry position is visible in the joint statement issued by the Global Tuna Alliance and the Sustainable Seafood Coalition on Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction.⁸⁶ Unlike Européche's more explicit emphasis on RFMO primacy, the GTA and SSC acknowledge that commercial fisheries are a major driver of biodiversity decline on the high seas and call for a robust BBNJ Treaty, including marine protected areas and environmental impact assessments. However, their position simultaneously reinforces the centrality of RFMOs by framing the treaty as complementary and by advocating for harmonisation rather than displacement of RFMO mandates. The statement emphasises that oversight of target fisheries remains the principal mandate of RFMOs, while the BBNJ instrument should address cumulative impacts beyond existing sectoral capacity. **As such, even where segments of the seafood sector publicly endorse ambitious biodiversity protection, the dominant framing continues to spread the idea of RFMO structures being efficient and sufficient to sustainably manage fish populations, shaping expectations that the Global Ocean Treaty should not interfere.**

Additionally, the 2022 seafood industry advocacy presentation on the Global Ocean Treaty (BBNJ), prepared with legal support from ClientEarth and developed in collaboration with seafood business coalitions including the Global Tuna Alliance and the Sustainable Seafood Coalition, setting out industry perspectives on how the treaty should interact with existing RFMO governance, further illustrates how segments of the seafood industry are positioning themselves within the BBNJ debate as constructive, solution-oriented stakeholders.⁸⁷ Through large pre-competitive coalitions representing dozens of retailers, processors, brands, and food service companies, the industry articulates support for a robust Global Ocean Treaty, including marine protected areas and a 30×30 commitment.

However, this advocacy is framed around harmonisation with RFMOs, economic stability, and the need for industry inclusion in treaty design. By emphasising the economic value of high seas fisheries, carbon storage, and supply chain stability, the sector situates itself as both dependent on and a steward of marine ecosystems. At the same time, calls for formal consultation with retailers and suppliers underscore a parallel objective: ensuring that the treaty's operational details remain aligned with commercial realities. This positioning reinforces a pattern seen elsewhere, where support for ambitious biodiversity goals is coupled with a preference for institutional continuity and shared governance with existing fisheries bodies rather than regulatory displacement of RFMO authority.

Official RFMO statements made during the post-2023 phase of the Global Ocean Treaty further reinforce this institutional positioning. At the first session of the Preparatory Commission for implementation of the BBNJ Agreement in 2025, the WCPFC Secretariat publicly highlighted the 'key role' of tuna RFMOs in implementing the treaty and strengthening global ocean governance. The Secretariat emphasised that the BBNJ Agreement and tuna RFMOs share common objectives and underscored the importance of cooperation consistent with existing

⁸⁶ <https://www.globaltunaalliance.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/BBNJ-Asks-FINAL.pdf>

⁸⁷ <https://marketac.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ClientEarth-Presentation-BBNJ.pdf>

RFMO mandates. This statement publicly situates RFMOs as central actors in high seas governance under the treaty framework.⁸⁸

Likewise, ICCAT Commission documentation adopted in 2025 encouraged continued Secretariat engagement with BBNJ processes, reflecting institutional recognition that RFMO expertise and mandate must inform implementation of area-based management tools.⁸⁹

It is important to note that there are limited direct public statements from private fishing industry companies explicitly addressing the Global Ocean Treaty in relation to RFMO authority. Much of the sector’s engagement occurs within RFMO processes or through national delegations, rather than through standalone public commentary on BBNJ negotiations.

However, **industry-oriented discussion of the treaty’s implications is visible in sector platforms.** The industrial tuna sector, via commentary channels linked to INFOFISH, an industry information service, published an article titled “BBNJ, RFMOs and Market: New Challenges for Sustainable Tuna Fisheries.”⁹⁰ The piece outlines industry-focused perspectives on how the BBNJ Agreement may require adjustments within existing RFMO systems and management practices. Although not issued by a specific fishing association, the article is clearly targeted at industry stakeholders and centres its analysis on the continuing centrality of RFMOs in managing tuna fisheries in the context of treaty implementation. It reflects industry concern with how RFMO policies might need to adapt to the new biodiversity framework, while underscoring the perception that the treaty should not interfere with RFMO authority.

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<https://www.wcpfc.int/news/wcpfc-highlights-key-role-tuna-rfmos-implementing-bbnj-treaty-and-strengthening-global-ocean>

⁸⁹ https://www.iccat.int/DocsComm/uploads/2025/PLE_129B_ENG_20251124170452.docx

⁹⁰ <https://infofish.org/v4/index.php/bbnj-rfmo-s-and-market-new-challenges-for-sustainable-tuna-fisheries>

Conclusion

The primary arena for shaping high seas fisheries policy remains within RFMO systems where industry actors are structurally integrated. This report examined fishing industry participation within RFMOs and the post-2023 PrepCom processes established under the Global Ocean Treaty. Using documentation from 2021 to 2025, it mapped patterns of institutional embedding and analysed narrative positioning. The purpose was to assess presence and observable patterns.

- The participation data demonstrates that industry-affiliated delegates form a consistent and significant proportion of RFMO annual meeting delegations. Across the prioritised commissions, industry representation generally fluctuates between roughly one quarter and one third of total participation, with certain bodies exceeding this proportion in specific years. This presence is not confined to observer status; in many cases, industry actors are formally embedded within state delegations. Representation is geographically dispersed but concentrated among major distant-water fishing states and regional blocs, indicating that institutional proximity to decision-making is strongest within major fishing powers. The stability of these proportions across multiple years suggests a normalised and structured integration of commercial fishing interests within RFMO governance.
- The analysis of public records and statements further shows a recurring narrative emphasis on RFMO competence and their authority being grounded on science. Industry associations and aligned actors consistently frame high seas fisheries as already managed through established, science-based systems, arguing that additional treaty-based spatial restrictions are redundant.
- The evidence presented here suggests that there is a major risk of RFMOs preventing restrictions to fishing activities in areas designated as protected areas through the BBNJ Treaty. This is promoted, in particular, through the continued affirmation of the exclusive mandate of RFMOs to manage fisheries on the high seas, much in line with industry statements and proposals. In order to ensure that the BBNJ Treaty delivers on existing international commitments on biodiversity protection, the Prep Comm 3 must agree on safeguards for the first Conference of the Parties, notably by limiting the time RFMOs - and other pre-existing sectoral bodies - would have to give their input on MPA proposals. This risk could hinder the implementation of the Treaty, given the significant influence that commercial fishing interests exert on RFMOs.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Table 11. ICCAT Annual Meetings - Industry Representation 2021-2025.

Institution	Year	Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties	Total Delegation Size	Number of Fishing Industry Representatives in Delegation
ICCAT	2025 ⁹¹	Algeria	12	2
		Angola	5	0
		Barbados	4	0
		Belize	5	1
		Brazil	19	3
		Canada	23	4
		China Mainland	12	4
		Costa Rica	1	0
		Côte d'Ivoire	9	0
		Cuba	2	0
		Curaçao	5	0
		Egypt	11	1
		El Salvador	4	1
		European Union	146	64
		France (St Pierre & Miquelon)	5	2
		Gabon	3	0
		Gambia	4	0
		Ghana	21	16
		Grenada	1	0
		Guatemala	5	0
		Guinea Bissau	6	0
Guinea (Rep.)	5	1		
Honduras	2	1		

⁹¹ https://www.iccat.int/DocsComm/uploads/2025/GEN_008A_20251121171235.docx

Institution	Year	Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties	Total Delegation Size	Number of Fishing Industry Representatives in Delegation
		Iceland	1	0
		Japan	17	4
		Republic of Korea	5	2
		Liberia	7	0
		Libya	6	3
		Mauritania	10	0
		Mexico	3	0
		Morocco	37	12
		Namibia	11	4
		Nicaragua	4	0
		Nigeria	4	0
		Norway	7	1
		Panama	7	5
		Philippines	5	0
		Russian Federation	3	0
		São Tomé & Príncipe	1	0
		Senegal	24	8
		Sierra Leone	2	0
		South Africa	9	5
		St. Vincent & the Grenadines	4	0
		Syrian Arab Republic	6	0
		Trinidad & Tobago	1	0
		Tunisia	12	6
		Türkiye	11	6
		United Kingdom	21	0
		United States	27	5
		Uruguay	1	0
		Venezuela	11	0

Institution	Year	Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties	Total Delegation Size	Number of Fishing Industry Representatives in Delegation
		Bolivia (Observer)	3	0
		Taiwan (Observer)	16	6
		Suriname (Observer)	1	0
ICCAT	2024 ⁹²	Costa Rica	1	0
		Albania	2	0
		Algeria	7	2
		Angola	4	0
		Barbados	3	0
		Belize	5	2
		Brazil	11	2
		Cabo Verde	1	0
		Canada	20	6
		China Mainland	15	6
		Côte d'Ivoire	7	1
		Curaçao	4	0
		Egypt	10	1
		El Salvador	5	1
		European Union	162	63
		France (St Pierre & Miquelon)	2	0
		Gabon	3	0
		The Gambia	4	0
		Ghana	27	14
		Guatemala	1	0
		Guinea (Rep.)	4	1
Honduras	2	0		
Iceland	1	0		

⁹² https://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_24-25-I-1.pdf

Institution	Year	Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties	Total Delegation Size	Number of Fishing Industry Representatives in Delegation
		Japan	14	5
		Republic of Korea	5	1
		Liberia	7	0
		Libya	2	0
		Mauritania	5	0
		Mexico	4	0
		Morocco	15	3
		Namibia	8	4
		Nicaragua	3	0
		Nigeria	3	0
		Norway	6	1
		Panama	8	4
		Philippines	4	0
		Russian Federation	3	0
		São Tomé & Príncipe	3	0
		Senegal	17	6
		Sierra Leone	1	0
		South Africa	8	4
		St Vincent & the Grenadines	2	0
		Trinidad & Tobago	2	0
		Tunisia	10	5
		Türkiye	6	3
		United Kingdom	17	0
		United States	34	4
		Uruguay	2	0
		Venezuela	5	0

Institution	Year	Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties	Total Delegation Size	Number of Fishing Industry Representatives in Delegation
ICCAT	2023 ⁹³	Ghana	21	11
		Albania	1	0
		Algeria	9	1
		Angola	4	0
		Barbados	2	0
		Belize	5	2
		Brazil	20	2
		Cabo Verde	1	0
		Canada	24	5
		China Mainland	13	4
		Côte d'Ivoire	7	0
		Curaçao	6	1
		Egypt	28	4
		El Salvador	5	2
		European Union	137	49
		France (SPM)	2	0
		Gabon	4	0
		The Gambia	4	0
		Guatemala	6	2
		Guinea (Rep.)	4	1
		Honduras	2	0
		Iceland	1	0
		Japan	17	6
		Republic of Korea	7	3
Liberia	5	1		
Libya	2	0		

⁹³ https://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_22-23_II-1.pdf

Institution	Year	Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties	Total Delegation Size	Number of Fishing Industry Representatives in Delegation
		Mauritania	10	0
		Mexico	5	0
		Morocco	18	6
		Namibia	9	0
		Nicaragua	3	0
		Nigeria	5	0
		Norway	5	0
		Panama	6	2
		Philippines	7	0
		Russian Federation	3	0
		Senegal	23	7
		Sierra Leone	6	0
		South Africa	8	5
		St Vincent & Grenadines	2	0
		Syrian Arab Republic	1	0
		Tunisia	11	5
		Türkiye	11	3
		United Kingdom	16	0
		United States	36	4
		Uruguay	3	0
Venezuela	10	0		
ICCAT	2022 ⁹⁴	Albania	2	0
		Algeria	15	3
		Angola	6	0
		Barbados	1	0
		Belize	5	2

⁹⁴ https://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_22-23_I-1.pdf

Institution	Year	Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties	Total Delegation Size	Number of Fishing Industry Representatives in Delegation
		Brazil	15	4
		Canada	23	6
		China Mainland	8	1
		Côte d'Ivoire	8	0
		Curaçao	8	3
		Egypt	17	2
		El Salvador	5	2
		European Union	118	41
		France (St Pierre & Miquelon)	4	2
		Gabon	4	0
		The Gambia	2	0
		Ghana	13	9
		Guatemala	3	1
		Guinea (Rep.)	4	0
		Honduras	3	0
		Iceland	2	0
		Japan	15	6
		Republic of Korea	8	5
		Liberia	4	0
		Libya	8	4
		Mauritania	8	0
		The Gambia	2	0
		Ghana	13	9
		Guatemala	3	1
		Guinea (Rep.)	4	0
		Honduras	3	0
		Iceland	2	0
		Japan	17	7

Institution	Year	Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties	Total Delegation Size	Number of Fishing Industry Representatives in Delegation
		Republic of Korea	8	5
		Liberia	4	0
		Libya	8	4
		Mauritania	8	0
		Mexico	4	0
		Morocco	16	7
		Namibia	7	0
		Nicaragua	4	0
		Nigeria	2	0
		Norway	7	0
		Panama	5	1
		Philippines	7	0
		Russian Federation	4	0
		São Tomé and Príncipe	3	0
		Senegal	14	4
		South Africa	6	3
		St Vincent and Grenadines	1	0
		Syrian Arab Republic	1	0
		Trinidad & Tobago	11	0
		Tunisia	23	10
		Türkiye	15	11
		United Kingdom	21	0
		United States	38	6
		Uruguay	2	0
		Venezuela	2	0
		Bolivia (Observer)	2	1
		Taiwan	12	4
		Costa Rica	5	0

Institution	Year	Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties	Total Delegation Size	Number of Fishing Industry Representatives in Delegation
		Guyana	1	0
		Suriname	1	0
ICCAT	2021 ⁹⁵	El Salvador	7	4
		Albania	1	0
		Algeria	4	0
		Angola	3	0
		Barbados	2	0
		Belize	4	1
		Brazil	9	1
		Cabo Verde	2	0
		Canada	28	5
		China Mainland	8	2
		Côte d'Ivoire	7	0
		Curaçao	5	2
		Egypt	9	2
		European Union	121	45
		France (St. Pierre & Miquelon)	2	0
		Gabon	3	0
		The Gambia	2	0
		Ghana	30	19
		Grenada	3	1
		Guatemala	6	2
		Guinea Bissau	1	0
		Guinea Rep.	4	0
Honduras	2	0		
Iceland	2	0		

⁹⁵ https://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_20-21_II-1.pdf

Institution	Year	Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties	Total Delegation Size	Number of Fishing Industry Representatives in Delegation
		Japan	18	8
		Republic of Korea	9	3
		Liberia	9	0
		Libya	3	0
		Mauritania	2	0
		Mexico	6	0
		Morocco	22	5
		Namibia	8	1
		Nicaragua	3	0
		Nigeria	3	0
		Norway	5	0
		Panama	9	4
		Philippines	9	0
		Russian Federation	2	0
		São Tomé & Príncipe	1	0
		Senegal	17	6
		Sierra Leone	2	0
		South Africa	6	3
		St. Vincent & Grenadines	2	0
		Trinidad & Tobago	10	0
		Tunisia	21	13
		Turkey	6	1
		United Kingdom	18	0
		United States	43	8
		Uruguay	2	0
		Venezuela	8	0